In the nineteen-forties and fifties, Canadians wanted the project built, but the Americans did not. Railways blocked American approval of the project, until toll charges were agreed upon which would effectively prevent most competition between the seaway and the railways. American companies which wanted cheap iron ore from Labrador also helped to counteract the railway lobby. High tolls have been set for products which railways prefer to carry. Lower tolls are charged for wheat, iron ore, and pulpwood. Professor Willoughby's masterful study is absolutely essential for an understanding of the seaway's economic, technical, political, and diplomatic history. After 1950, of course, the author has had less access to source materials, and has not been so free to draw conclusions. If Canada is ever to have a toll-free seaway which would benefit the whole Canadian economy, there is a long struggle ahead. Professor Willoughby's study will be a first-class handbook in this struggle. 
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Professor Willoughby's masterful study is absolutely essential for an understanding of the seaway's economic, technical, political, and diplomatic history. After 1950, of course, the author has had less access to source materials, and has not been so free to draw conclusions. If Canada is ever to have a toll-free seaway which would benefit the whole Canadian economy, there is a long struggle ahead. Professor Willoughby's study will be a first-class handbook in this struggle. The chief value of this volume is the intimate insight it gives into practical politics on Capitol Hill, the shifting tides of regional pressures, the attempts of successive Republican presidents to dispose of the properties to private interests, and the herculean efforts these interests--especially Ford--made to acquire the plants and dams on virtually their own terms. The most forbidding aspect of the book is the monotonous plethora of detail. Only rarely does Dr. Hubbard pause to summarize or to emphasize key points; the reader is constantly in danger of losing the forest for the trees. Although both documentation and bibliography testify to the quantitative extent of the author's research, they also reveal his almost exclusive reliance, so far as primary sources are concerned, on newspapers, periodicals, and government manuscripts and documents. Despite the fact that five out of twelve chapters are devoted to the Ford and American Cyanamid bids, there is no indication that the writer sought or obtained access to the records of those corporations or their officers. Granted, his conclusions might not have been altered thereby, but they certainly would have carried more conviction. As it is, the reader is presumably expected to share Dr. Hubbard's easy assumption that all schemes other than Norris's were, if not sinister, at least contrary to the public interest.
Origins of the TVA, in sum, makes a valuable contribution to an understanding of the political details of the Muscle Shoals struggle. But even though the author alleges in the preface an equal interest in the economic origins of TVA, he hardly does justice to this aspect of the controversy. Hence it is diffleult to regard this book as "comprehensive" or--in view of the writer's failure to use the pertinent business records and his persistent championship of Norris--as "objective." Since
